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Abstract 
The study documented agricultural policies through the period 1970-1993; 
implementation deviation for ten agricultural policy variables, eight of which are fiscal 
and two monetary; and identified discontinuities in agricultural policies. In addition, it 
computed volatility measures for ten agricultural policy instruments and six regulated 
commodity prices. 
The estimates of implementation deviation indicate consequential over- and under-
shooting of policy targets. The results show that the implementation deviation was 
persistent and volatile in addition to being consequential. Therefore, the concern that 
private agents have about government not keeping its word is legitimate. Similarly, their 
concern about policy discontinuities is also valid. 
In general, volatility was most intense for most policy variables in the structural 
adjustment period, implying that agricultural policies were relatively more stable before 
than after adjustment. This suggests that the major policy shift of 1985-1986 heightened 
policy instability. However, political instability pre-dated structural adjustment and could 
be associated with long-term instability of agricultural policies. For instance, we found 
that no agricultural programmes outlived the political regimes that introduced them while 
each new regime put in place new programmes. 
Finally, even without a comprehensive evaluation of the credibility of agricultural 
policies, it is hardly likely that a policy regime would be credible if implementation 
deviations are consequential, persistent and volatile, and policy variables exhibit long-
term volatility. Therefore, the partial assessment notwithstanding, the effects of political 
instability and structural adjustment on the credibility of agricultural policies are worthy 
of further investigations. 
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1. Introduction 
The research environment 
The basic economic policy problem in Nigeria remains: how can government be a more 
socially responsible and effective economic agent? The dimensions of this problem could 
be deduced from the other key economic agent in the economy, that is, the private agent. 
The following statements reflect some of the concerns of private Nigerian economic 
agents about the key instrument of public policy in Nigeria, the budget:1 
"I am glad that it (the budget) has not reversed some of the positive moves 
made last year.....comments are made on the assumption that implementation 
would be faithful. Previous experiences have shown that these expectations 
are not always valid....the interest rate being left at 21% with inflation going 
at about 70-80 per cent is not good for the banking sector in mobilizing 
loanable funds" (Mr. Kolade, Chairman of Cadbury (Nigeria) PLC).2 
"only the implementation would determine how good it is"3 
"the budget is a fine paperwork that shows the level of government's deep 
concern for economic recovery. But whether it would be implemented in the 
same spirit is another matter" (Chief Olukayode Akindele, Chairman of 
the Osogbo Steel Rolling Mills).4 
"we have always had fine budgets, but implementation is always the 
problem" (Dr. Adegbite, an executive council member of the Lagos 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry). 
"It is good that the foreign exchange policy which was central to the macro-
economic stability witnessed last year is retained" (Mr. Erasmus Akingbola, 
MD/CEO, Nigerian Intercontinental Merchant Bank Limited). 
"As long as the exchange rate remains relatively stable, it would be easier 
to plan" (Mr. Dipo Aina, MD of a Lagos based investment banking outfit). 
"in 1994, there was a policy U-turn. In 1995, there was no U-turn, and so 
we can say well-done to government for standing still. In an environment 
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such as ours, where there are frequent policy shifts, that 's an 
achievement....the decision to hang on to N22 for government transaction 
and autonomous rate for other transactions does not augur well for 
transparency" (Mr. Atedo Peterside, CEO of IBTC, Lagos). 
Four positive statements could be deduced from these statements: 
• Private expectations about implementation of public policy are often not fulfilled. 
In other words, government does not always keep its word. 
• There are frequent shifts or discontinuities in government policies. In other words, 
government policies are unstable.5 
• Conflicts among public policies are frequent. In other words, there are inconsistencies 
or incompatibilities in government policies. 
« Private Nigerian economic agents desire stable and consistent public policies and a 
government that keeps its word. 
These four statements are relevant and interesting research problems in Nigeria for 
two reasons. First, they reflect some of the concerns Nigerian private economic agents 
have about public policy. As a result, if the objective of public policy research is to 
minimize the constraint public policy poses to the choices and actions of private Nigerian 
economic agents, their concerns are the practical and logical points of reference. Second, 
the questions are positive, hence they could be objectively evaluated. In other words, it 
is possible to find out if the concerns have foundations in fact. Therefore, research that 
seeks to establish the empirical validity of the statements assumes relevance in the process 
of Nigerian public policy reform. 
The research problem 
Agricultural reform policies were pivotal to the structural adjustment programme Nigeria 
implemented between 1986 and 1993. For example, core adjustment policies such as 
trade and exchange liberalization and dissolution of commodity boards and their system 
of price controls were primarily targeted at the agricultural sector. Similarly, public policies 
on agriculture were important parts of government budgets and the four development 
plans the government designed and implemented in 1962-1985. Thus, it is reasonable to 
investigate the four positive questions about agricultural policy. 
This study, however, is limited to two research questions: 
• Is the deviation in the implementation of agricultural policy consequential? 
• Are agricultural policies discontinuous? 
The first question evaluates the proposition that government does not always keep its 
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word, while the second investigates the proposition that government policies are unstable. 
In answering both questions, a historical, systematic and comprehensive profile of 
agricultural policies over the 1970-1993 period is a useful tool. Further, a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the credibility of government would have to investigate the 
problem of inconsistencies or incompatibilities in government policies. Thus, by excluding 
the problem of inconsistencies or incompatibilities in government policies, the study is a 
partial investigation of the credibility problem of agricultural policies. 
Objectives of the study 
The study has four primary objectives. The profile of agricultural policies over the 1970-
1993 period is the first. The profile includes agricultural policies in the development 
plans and annual and ad hoc budgets; it also covers fiscal and monetary policies and 
programmes and institutional changes. Second, the study computes and analyses the 
implementation deviation for important agricultural policy variables. Third, it investigates 
the stability of agricultural policies from the "policy profile" and computes volatility 
indexes for selected quantitative indicators of policy. Finally, the study deduces possible 
explanations for observed policy (in)stability. 
2. Research framework 
Basic assumptions and implications 
The study assumes that: 
• A substantial and persistent deviation in the implementation of public policies is a 
constraint to private plans 
• Private agents desire stable public policies 
• Implementation deviation could be computed 
• Discontinuities in agricultural policies could be deduced from a long-term profile of 
agricultural policies 
Justifications for the assumptions 
The first two assumptions of the study are deduced from the concerns of Nigerian private 
economic agents. In addition, they are central to the monetarist/non-monetarist policy 
debate and the theory of economic inter-dependence. We can show this through an 
adaptation of the flow chart (Figure 1) of the theory of economic policy in Gordon (1990: 
453) and his summary of the debate. 
The flow chart shows that policy variables and exogenous non-policy variables feed 
into structural relations, which in turn connect the exogenous (policy and non-policy) 
variables to endogenous (target and non-target) variables. The flow chart also implies 
that total "economic welfare...depends on the achieved values of the target variables, 
and... the decisions of policy-makers." Notice that the structural relations and the targets, 
respectively, reflect the behaviour of private agents and their economic pay-offs. The 
flow chart implies that the behaviours of private economic agents engaged in agricultural 
activities in Nigeria are sensitive to the agricultural policies of government. 
One of the key propositions of the new Keynesian macroeconomics is that "what 
matters for the economy is not what...policy-makers say, but what they do." The new 
classical macroeconomics (NCM), on the other hand, contends that the divergence between 
what policy makers say and do matters. In addition, they argue that if policies are credible 
(that is, agents believe that deviation between what policy makers say and actually do is 
zero), policies would be ineffective. 
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Figure 1: Flow chart showing the relations among exogenous variables, agricultural 
structural relations and targets and economic welfare 
POLICY STRUCTURAL 
INSTRUMENTS RELATIONS TARGETS 
The statements by the Nigerian private economic agents presented above reveal that 
both what policy makers say and what they do matter, hence the deviation between what 
policy makers say and do matters. To be specific, the private Nigerian economic agents 
imply that consequential deviations in implementation of public policies are undesirable. 
The deviation between what policy makers say and do measures implementation 
deviation.6 
The New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) distinguishes between rigid rules, 
feedback rules and discretionary policies. Of the three, only rigid rules are immune to 
shocks and discontinuities. For example, a constant growth rate rule (CGRR) for money 
supply is advocated for by monetarists and favoured by the NCM on the premise that it 
does not generate instability. Feedback rules are most likely to be unstable because they 
require that a policy instrument (say, expenditure on agriculture) be set to respond in a 
regular way to a macroeconomic event (say, inflation). Thus, unanticipated inflation 
shocks would cause unanticipated changes in expenditure on agriculture. Discretionary 
policy "treats each macroeconomic episode as a unique event, without any attempt to 
respond in the same way from one episode to another" (Gordon, 1990:472). Consequently, 
discretionary policy is discontinuous. These imply that rigid rules are stable, feedback 
rules less stable and discretionary policies inherently unstable. 
The classification of policies into rigid rules, feedback rules and discretionary policies 
offers useful guides in analysing policy stability. In addition, it offers a mechanism for 
investigating the factors motivating changes in policy. For instance, it is obvious that 
policies that are likely to be unstable are feedback rules and discretionary policies, with 
the latter more likely to be erratic than the former. Thus, it is possible to begin the analysis 
of policy stability with a characterization of agricultural policies into rigid rules, feedback 
rules and discretionary policies from a documentary review of agricultural policy over 
the period of analysis. 
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Organization of the study 
The study has a simple three-part organizational structure consisting of: (1) documentation 
of agricultural policies; (2) computation and analysis of implementation deviation; and 
(3) detection and analysis of discontinuities in policy. 
Documentation of agricultural policies 
The study covers the period 1970-1993. In this period, Nigeria implemented 2 National 
Development Plans (the third and fourth plans), 18 annual budgets, 18 credit guidelines 
and a number of agricultural policy documents.7 In addition, Nigeria designed four three-
year rolling plans (1990-1992; 1991-1993; 1992-1994 and 1993-1995). These documents 
are therefore the basic sources of government agricultural policies. Section 3 documents 
the key agricultural policies and their evolution. 
Computation and analysis of implementation deviation 
This begins with identification of policy instruments for which implementation deviation 
could be computed. These instruments are a subset of the policies implemented over the 
period. Because the requirements for computing implementation deviation are a useful 
guide in determining this subset, we begin with the requirements for computing 
implementation deviation. 
The implementation deviation for policy i (d) could be measured as: 
(1) 
where, 
PA. = announced value of policy i 
P". = actual value of policy i 
The percentage deviation is given by: 
pd~[(Pa. - J " . )//*]* 100 (2) 
Equations 1 and 2 show two requirements for being in the sub-set. First, the policy 
instrument is measurable. Second, the data on its announced and actual values are 
available. The federal development plans, the federal budgets and the three-year rolling 
plans are used by government to announce agricultural policy. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria's Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts reveal figures of actual policy 
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variables. In addition, they report CBN's survey of agriculture and appraisal of the 
performance of the annual budgets. Therefore, the data from both sources would be used 
to compute the implementation deviation. 
It is important to point out for this and subsequent analysis in the study the multiple 
sources of government documents announcing government's intentions implies that 
deviation between what government says and what it does may not be unique unless 
government is consistent in the three documents. Thus, it would be necessary to investigate 
announcement consistency by estimating deviations in policy variables in all its policy 
documents. The purpose of this estimation is to ascertain the consistency in policy 
announcement. However, for the purpose of implementation deviation, the budget values 
of the policy would be used mainly because private individuals base many of their 
economic plans and expectations on the budget. The second issue has to do with 
interpretation of the results. Let us therefore determine the possible values pd. could 
assume and then deduce the implication of each. From Equation 2: 
pd = [(Pa;PArl)]*m (3) 
From Equation 3: 
pd. = 0; implies Pa. = PAl 
• pd; > 0; implies Pat >PA. or overshooting of announced policy 
• pd. < 0; implies Pa. < P'\ or undershooting of announced policy 
Identifying and analysing policy discontinuities 
The documentation of agricultural policy is the primary tool for detecting discontinuities 
and shocks in agricultural policies. The documentation as presented in Section 3 makes 
it possible to identify policy shifts or U-turns and their frequency. At this stage, we are 
not concerned with causes of the shifts. Rather, the study is limited to ascertaining the 
validity of the proposition that there are major discontinuities or consequential shocks in 
agricultural policies. 
Gordon (1990) suggests that if the rate of growth of a policy variable, for instance, 
government's real expenditures, is uneven, the policy instrument is unstable and vice 
versa.8 This implies that the trend of growth rates of policy instruments could be used as 
an indicator of policy stability.9 Thus, we would investigate the time paths of key 
instruments of agricultural policy over the period of the study to determine the existence 
(or nonexistence) of regular patterns in the behaviour of the agricultural policy variables. 
We could also complement the estimation and analysis of the growth rates of policy 
variables by plotting them in graphs. This would make it possible to investigate and 
identify periods of relatively high and low fluctuations. 
3. Profile of agricultural policies, 1970-1993 
Agricultural policy of 1970-1993 could be classified into six broad groups: agricultural 
policy in the development plans; agricultural policy in the annual budget; budget and 
plan allocations to agriculture; sectoral credit allocations to agriculture; ad hoc agricultural 
policy; and major agricultural policy programmes. The documentary overview of 
agricultural policies in 1970-1993 focuses on all six groups. At the end, we summarize 
the major institutional changes as a first step in the investigation of the stability of 
agricultural policies. 
Agricultural policy in the development plans 
Table la shows a summary of the objectives of agricultural policy in the second, third 
and fourth plans. The table shows that the agricultural policies in the development plans 
are supposed to target nutritional requirements of the population; production (food and 
export crops); rural employment; and institutional environment of private economic agents 
engaged in agricultural activities. 
Table la shows that apart from nutritional targets, the plans do not quantify I lie 
agricultural policy targets. The second plan did not specify the numerical values of I he 
nutritional targets. The third and fourth specify values for expected protein consumption, 
but only the fourth plan provides numerical values for calorie consumption. It could be 
observed that the expected values of protein intake in the fourth plan (49.7grams) is 
between 17.2% and 23.5% less than the target in the third plan (60 to 65 grams). It is not 
clear whether the expected protein intake in the fourth plan was adjusted downwards, 
but it is unlikely to be in compliance with global nutritional standards. 
Some targets specify expected directions of policy impact while others are ambiguous. 
For instance, all three plans are clear about the expected direction of production (increase). 
This is also true of the objective of employment. Some of the institutional objectives are 
less clear, however. For instance, the objective of propagating agricultural material 
production and of evolving appropriate institutional apparatus for integrated agricultural 
development (in the second plan) is ambiguous. Such ambiguities pose evaluation 
problems to policy analysis. 
Table lb shows a selection of the agricultural policy instruments in the second, third 
and fourth plans. The distinction between strategy and policy instrument is not very 
clear in the plans; in fact, the terms are used interchangeably. Table lb shows that 
agricultural policy in the plans consists of: non-price incentive support programmes (e.g., 
farm services centres; National Agricultural Cooperative Management Centre; World 
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Table 1a: Agricultural policy objectives in Nigeria: 1970-1993 
9 
Second Plan Objectives Third Plan Objectives Fourth Plan Objectives 
- To increase the calorie - To increase calorie intake and - To attain a per capita intake 
and protein intakes of a crude protein consumption per day of 2,073 Kcal and 49.7 
Nigerians especially of between 60 and 65 grams grams of crude protein by 1985 
in the south 
- To increase animal protein relative 
to protein from other sources 
- To ensure food supplies 
to keep pace with 
increasing population 
• To expand production of 
export crops in order to 
diversify foreign 
exchange earnings 
- To ensure food supply in 
adequate quantity and quality 
to the increasing population 
- To increase production of 
food and export crops 
• To increase food production in 
order to attain self-sufficiency 
• To increase production and 
processing of export crops 
• To increase the output 
by smallholders 
- To create rural employ- - To expand employment - To expand employment 
ment opportunities for the opportunities to absorb the opportunities to absorb 
growing labour force increasing labour force the increasing labour force 
- To propagate agricultural 
materials production 
- To guarantee adequate returns 
to farmers and ensure reasonable 
prices to consumers 
- To provide adequate storage 
and processing facilities 
• To encourage private 
entrepreneurs to establish 
large-scale farms 
• To make farm inputs more 
accessible to farmers 
- To expand and improve extension - To induce commercial banks 
services to give more loans for agriculture 
- To evolve appropriate 
institutional apparatus for 
integrated agricultural 
development 
- To promote the evolution of 
appropriate institutional and 
administrative apparatus for 
rapid agricultural development 
- To properly organize cooperative 
farming, processing and cash 
crop farming 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria, second, third and fourth National Development Plans. 
Bank assisted ADPs; River Basin and Rural Development Authority; Agricultural Credit 
Guarantee Scheme; and so on); price incentive programmes (e.g., price and tax incentives, 
guaranteed minimum price introduced, subsidies on inputs and so on); macroeconomic 
policies (e.g., fixed and stable exchange and interest rate policy); direct government 
participation in agriculture; and institutional changes (e.g., re-organization of commodity 
boards). 
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Table 1b: Selected agricultural policies in the second, third and fourth Nigerian National 
Development Plans 
Second Plan (1970-1974) Third Plan (1975-1980) Fourth Plan (1981-1985) 
• Small motor-powered 
implements and animal-
drawn implements 
• Increased government 
participation in direct food 
production and processing 
« Farm services centres set 
up to deliver inputs to 
smallholders 
• Emphasis on food crops • World Bank assisted small 
holders programme 
• Integrated Agricultural 
Development Programme 
• Establishment of National 
Agricultural Cooperative 
Management Centre 
• Expansion of World Bank 
assisted ADPs 
• Reduction of government's 
direct involvement in food 
production 
• Introduction of River Basin 
and Rural Development 
Authority 
• National Seed 
Multiplication Centre 
• National Accelerated 
Food Production 
Programme (NAFPP) 
8 NAFPP de-emphasized 
• National Grains Production 
Company 
• National Root Crops 
Production Company 
established 
• Joint ventures by National 
Root Crops Production 
Company, National 
Grains Production Company 
and National Beverages 
Company Limited. 
• Cocoa, Cotton, Rubber and 
National Oil Palm 
rehabilitation schemes 
• Nigerian Agricultural 
Credit Bank (NACB) 
proposal 
• Agricultural credit guarantee 
scheme 
• More resources to the NACB 
and Agricultural Credit 
Corporation 
• Price and tax incentives, 
guaranteed minimum price 
introduced, subsidies 
on inputs 
« Input subsidy to be continued 
• The guaranteed minimum 
prices to be reviewed more 
frequently 
• Fixed exchange rate policy, 
interest rate regulation 
• Fixed exchange rate policy 
• Interest rate regulation 
• High public investments 
• High fiscal deficits 
• Fixed exchange rate policy 
• Interest rate regulation, high 
public investments 
• High fiscal deficits 
• Rising debt service 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria, second, third and fourth National Development Plans. 
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The table reveals a preference of government for programmes as the major tool of 
agricultural policy. Tables la and lb suggest difficulties in the assignment of policies to 
targets because the number of targets in each plan is not equal to that of instruments It 
may thus be difficult to evaluate the policy instruments precisely. 
Agricultural policy in the annual budget, 1970-1993 
Annex A shows the agricultural policy announced in the federal budgets over the period 
as well as the objectives of agricultural policy and the policy instruments (classified int ' 
those retained from previous period and new ones). In most cases, the policies and polic° 
instruments are specified as they were in the budgets. This was designed to reflect ^ 
closely as possible the position of government. This is important if we are to understand 
government's perception, thinking and expectations. 
The second column of Annex A shows the objectives of agricultural policy in ea h 
budget year. The objectives are numbered to show their differences. The table shows that 
between 1976/77 and 1993 there were 35 different policy objectives. The objectives of 
agriculture could be categorized into: 
. Sectoral growth and productivity (e.g., increase in production of food and cash croos 
increase in productivity) p ' 
• Sectoral contributions to development (e.g., maximized contribution of cash CTOD 
to development, integrated rural development, self-sufficiency in food increased 
supply of agricultural raw materials, reduction in import dependency, reduction in 
rural-urban welfare gap, etc.) 
. Macroeconomic (e.g., reduction in inflation, increase in rural employment highe 
export earnings, reduction in food imports, etc.) ' r 
. Institutional (e.g., increase in foreign investment, improvement in food storage 
reduction in post harvest loss, etc.) ® ' 
Annex A reveals at least three attributes of agricultural policy objectives. First th 
number of objectives in each budget ranges from one in 1981,1982 and 1985 to ' ^ 
1986. Second, agricultural policy had multiple objectives (with the exception of m i " 
1982 and 1985). Third, most agricultural policy objectives are not expressed in 
magnitudes. 
The third column of Annex A shows the policies retained in each budget while th 
fourth column shows the new policy instruments or strategies announced in the budget6 
The agricultural policy instruments in Annex A are classified into the following fo 
groups: g u r 
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• Fiscal policy (e.g., investment incentive policies, allocations, etc.) 
• Institutional changes (new programmes such as Operation Feed the Nation, Green 
Revolution, transfer of agriculture from schedule I to II, integrated rural development 
schemes, DFRRI, Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme, and so on) 
• Credit and interest policy (sectoral credit allocations) 
• Foreign trade policies (import and export bans, import duty relief, etc.) 
Annex A shows at least three characteristics of agricultural policy in the budgets. 
First, each budget has multiple instruments. Second, each budget consists of old and new 
instruments. Third, institutional changes and especially agricultural programmes are the 
major instruments of agricultural policy. 
Budget and plan allocations to agriculture 
Table 2 shows allocations to agriculture in the federal budgets of 1977/78 to 1993 while 
Table 3 shows the allocations to agriculture in the second, third and fourth development 
plans and the three rolling plans announced in the 1990-1993 federal budgets. Table 2 
shows that: 
• Average percentage total allocation to agriculture ranged from 2.76% in 1977-1980 
to 8.03% in 1981-1985, while it averaged 4.83% in 1977-1993. 
• Capital allocations accounted for a higher percentage of total capital allocations 
relative to current allocations (the range for capital allocations was 3.38% to 13.12%, 
compared with 0.41% to 1.14% for current allocations). 
• Though current allocations rose at a faster rate (54.62%) than capital allocations 
(50.941%) over the 1978-1993 period, much of its growth was in the 1986-1993 
period. 
According to Table 3, the share of agriculture in the capital plans of the three 
development plans was between 3.90% (third plan) and 12.0% (fourth plan). Clearly, 
therefore, the share of agriculture in plan expenditures did not match either its contribution 
to GDP or its share of employment. Moreover, the share of agriculture in the capital 
programmes of the four rolling plans was between 17.47% (1993-1995 plan) and 28.279% 
(1990-1992 plan). Although the shares of agriculture rose under the rolling plans, the 
effects of high inflation and crowding out of capital expenditures in the adjustment years 
implied even lower capital allocations to agriculture. Fertilizer procurement, furthermore, 
accounted for over half the capital allocations to agriculture in the rolling plans. Clearly, 
the capital allocations in the rolling plans grossly overstate capital allocations since 
fertilizer is an input, not a fixed asset. 
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Table 2: Budget allocations to agriculture (relative shares and growth rates) 
1 3 
Rolling Current Capital Total Current Capital Total 
plan (% shares) (% shares) (% shares (% growth) (% growth) (% growth) 
1977-93 0.84 8.96 4.83 54.62 49.51 50.91 
1977-80 1.12 3.38 2.76 23.30 69.24 63.47 
1981-85 0.73 13.12 8.03 0.49 67.51 59.78 
1986-89 0.41 10.04 4.31 31.17 14.85 15.46 
1990-93 1.14 8.19 3.44 169.20 46.87 65.86 
1986-93 0.78 9.11 3.87 100.19 30.86 40.66 
Source: Computed from federal budgets, 1977/78-1993. 
Table 3: Allocations to agriculture in development and rolling plans 
Rolling 
plan 
Agriculture 
(N million) 
DFRRI Fertilizer Allocation to 
agricultural 
items as 
% of total 
NALDA Water 
resources 
1970-74 74.49 
(4.11%) 
- - 4.11 - -
1975-80 1012.60 
(3.90%) 
- - 3.90 - -
1981-85 5130.0 
(1.20%) 
- - 12.0 - -
1990-92 1286.718 
(24.64%) 
936.0 
(17.92%) 
3000 
(57.44%) 
28.279 - -
1991-93 1054.00 
(15.12%) 
996.09 
(17.41%) 
3102.0 
(54.21%) 
21.89 - 570.59 
(9.97%) 
1992-94 733.88 
(12.96%) 
325.00 
(5.40%) 
3460.00 
(57.50%) 
24.97 900.00 
(14.96%) 
598.685 
(9.18%) 
1993-95 7719 
(80.12%) 
932.86 
(9.68%) 
- 17.47 982.00 
(10.2%) 
-
Sources: Federal Ministry of National Planning, second, third and fourth National Development Plans; Federal 
Budgets, 1990-1993. 
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Sectoral credit allocations to agriculture 
Table 4 shows the minimum percentage of commercial and merchant banks' credit 
approved for allocation to agriculture. The approved lending rates are stable before and 
after the sharp increases in 1985/86 for commercial banks and 1987 for merchant banks. 
The sharp increases occurred in the first phase of structural adjustment in Nigeria. This 
type of control is, of course, incompatible with the liberal economic policy regime the 
government claimed to be fostering. It is also important to point out that the structural 
adjustment was facilitated by the political shock of 1985. Therefore, the sharp increases 
could be attributed mainly to the political shock, especially since the increase is not 
compatible with the policy preferences of the new regime. 
Table 4: Approved sectoral credit allocations to agriculture 
Period Commercial banks Merchant banks 
1977-78 6.0 6.0 
1981-82 8.0 5.0 
1983-84 8.0 5.0 
1985 12.0 6.0 
1986 15.0 6.0 
1987-93 15.0 10.0 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts, 1977-1993. 
Ad hoc agricultural policy 
Some of the major agricultural policy programmes were not designed or announced as 
part of the development plans, rolling plans or annual budgets. Rather, they were designed 
within budget years and announced through policy statements. Annex B shows four of 
the major programmes: the new commodity marketing system (1977); the Green 
Revolution programme (1980); the structural adjustment programme (1986);I0and the 
New Agricultural Policy (1988). It also shows three relatively smaller programmes— 
Accelerated Development Area Programme (ADA), Livestock Development Project 
(LDP) and Rural Agro-Industrial Scheme (RAIS). 
Four main points are worth noting about Annex B. First, the structural adjustment 
programme (SAP) and the New Agricultural Policy (NAP) had similar objectives and 
instruments. This is not surprising since the NAP was guided by the same faith in the 
powers of the market that generated SAP. In fact, the NAP could be referred to as a 
subset of SAP. Second, only the new commodity marketing system had a one-to-one 
correspondence between instruments and objectives. Even then, a clear causal link between 
instruments and objectives is not very obvious. It is thus unclear how the instruments are 
ATJ ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND STABILITY OF NIGERIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 1 5 
to achieve objectives that lack quantified guideposts. Third, the introduction and 
termination of three programmes (new commodity marketing system [NCMS], Green 
Revolution [GR], Accelerated Development Area Programme [ADA], Livestock 
Development Project [LDP] and Rural Agro-Industrial Scheme [RAIS]) are attributable 
to political changes.uFourth, the ad hoc agricultural programmes and policies were biased 
in favour of crops. Since these programmes turned out to be the main agricultural strategies 
of the governments that introduced them, the bias was not compatible with the realization 
of nutritionally balanced agricultural output. 
The ad hoc character of the programmes has two implications. First, the implementation 
of the policies could hardly facilitate budgetary discipline and effective control. In fact, 
they seem more favoured to rent-seeking behaviour. Second, the longevity of the 
programmes is undermined by the ad hoc character of their origins. 
Review of major agricultural policy programmes 
Three programmes are the focus of the review: River Basin Development Authorities 
(RBDAs), the Integrated Agricultural Development Projects, and the Directorate of Foods, 
Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI). Our discussion of these programmes 
focuses on their evolution and objectives. 
River Basins Development Authorities (RBDAs) 
Annex C shows key information on the evolution of River Basin Development Authorities 
from 1970 to 1993. The objectives of the RBDAs when the idea was conceived in 1970 
were to: 
• Provide large-scale mechanized clearing and farming of land for farmers 
• Construct dams and bore-holes 
• Supply electricity 
• Build agro-allied centres with workshops and tractor hire services 
• Ensure large-scale multiplication of improved seeds 
• Provide for large-scale rearing of improved livestock and poultry and distribution to 
farmers 
• Establish grazing reserves 
• Encourage large-scale afforrestation schemes 
• Train junior staff for maintenance of rural development projects 
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Three points are worth noting about the first 13 years (1970-1983) of the R B D A S 
The first is that the gestation period between conception and operations of the first two 
RBDAs (Sokoto-Rima and Chad Basin) was four years. Action lags of this type raise 
costs (plant and operating) and jeopardize the rationality of public investments especially 
in periods of high inflation. The second point is that the 1974-1983 period had fewer 
changes in the number and operations of RBDA than the 1984-1993 period. Finally, 
federal allocations to RBRDAs declined especially after 1983. Figure 2 shows the decline 
of nominal values of the allocations and actual expenditure of RBRDAs. It is clear that 
adjustment for the high inflation of 1986-1993 would reveal sharper real decline. 
The series of changes in the 1984-1993 period began in 1984 with an additional 
function (rural development) and a change in name—to River Basins and Rural 
Development Authorities (RBRDAs). In addition, the 11 RBDAs were increased to 18 
following a decentralization of the RBDAs. The RBRDAs were relieved of the function 
of direct participation in production in 1985, supposedly to enable them to focus on land 
preparation, irrigation and provision of inputs. In a reorganization that took three years 
to complete, the number of RBRDAs was reduced to 11 (the pre-1984 number). 
Figure 2: Allocations and expenditures of RBRDAs, 1981-1993 (N million) 
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The reorganization was followed in 1990-1993 by a policy of privatization and 
commercialization and a narrowing of functions. For instance, in 1990, RBRDAs ceased 
to participate in the distribution of farm inputs to farmers and in direct production. In 
1991, their role was limited to the provision of water. It is worth mentioning that the 
functions of the Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), set up 
in 1986, had already overlapped significantly with those of the RBRDAs. However, the 
subsequent sale of non-water assets of some RBRDAs may have had less to do with 
efficiency than with politics, rent and "personalization" of public wealth. 
The commercialization policy that took root in 1991 affected the following RBRDA 
services: "design, construction and management of earth dams/irrigation, drainage 
schemes, drilling of bore-holes, plant/equipment hiring and land clearing" (CBN, 
1992:86). If private firms are more efficient than public firms, it follows that rational 
private agents would patronize private companies rather than RBRDAs. Besides, many 
public water boards at the state levels have more experience than RBRDAs in the supply 
of water and water related services. Therefore, the economic rationale for limiting 
RBRDAs to water supply is hardly credible, especially when the DFRRI has a wide 
coverage of ministries (agriculture, water resources, health, works, power, etc.) and 
functions and is neither commercialized, decentralized nor privatized. Further, the 
information about RBRDAs became more limited in 1990-1993. For instance, it was 
not clear how many RBRDAs were left in 1990-1993. Central Bank (1991,1992) reports, 
which were based on the returns of the existing ones, suggest that there were only seven 
RBRDAs in 1991 and six in 1992. -
In 1993, the federal government enacted Decree 101 of 1993, which vests in the 
federal government ownership of all surface and underground water resources in Nigeria, 
This implies that users are to obtain licences before development of the resource. The 
decree secures monopoly power over water resources to government and is clearly 
incompatible with liberalization. The monopoly power, the weak economic justifications 
for selling the assets of RBRDAs and the weak information about RBRDAs, conduce 
rent-seeking behaviours and weaken the credibility of the institutional reform of the 
RBRDAs in the structural adjustment era (especially 1990-1993). 
Integrated agricultural development projects (ADPs) 
The integrated agricultural development projects (ADPs) were conceived in the early 
1970s as a means of raising productivity and farmers' incomes in the rural areas through 
the provision of improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, credit facilities and infrastructure 
(roads, water supply and health care). Consequently, the ADPs are the forerunners of the 
DFRRI (as we shall show below). Unlike the RBDAs and DFRRI, the ADPs were partly 
financed by external credit from the World Bank. Table 6 shows that the finance of ADPs 
was shared almost equally between federal government, the states and the World Bank 
in 1981-1985. However, the share of the federal bank fell to 13.33% in 1986 while that 
of the World Bank rose to about 50%. Thus, though the total capital allocations to ADPs 
rose to N583.56 million in 1986-1993, from N192.42 in 1981-1985, that of the federal 
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Figure 3: Capital allocations to 
ADPs, 1981-1993 (US$ and naira) 
N3ira — US$ -
Figure 4: World Bank credit to 
ADPs, 1981-1993 (US$ and naira) 
government declined to N55.10 million from N59.80 million. Figures 3 and 4 show, 
respectively, that much of the increase in total allocations and World Bank allocations in 
1986-1993 can be explained by the devaluation of the naira. 
Table 6 also shows that the ADPs increased their supply of fertilizers to farmers from 
an annual average of 98.4 thousand in 1981-1985 to 584.07 thousand in 1986-1996. 
However, the constructions of feeder roads fell from 2,111.40 km to 1,028.70 km over 
the same period. 
Table 6: Capital allocations to ADPs and key performance indicators 1981-1993 
Period Federal State World Miscella- Federal Total Fertilizer Feeder 
% % Bank (%) neous (%) allocations allocations (000) roads (km) 
(N million) (N million) 
1981-85 34.06 32.51 33.43 0.0 59.80 192.42 98.4 2,111.40 
1986-93 13.33 28.42 50.10 8.25 55.10 583.56 584.07 1,028.70 
1981-93 21.24 30.00 43.67 5.09 56.91 433.12 397.27 1,445.11 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts, (1977-1993). 
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Annex D shows the evolution of ADPs from 2 (1974) to 3 (1975), 5 (1980), 9 (1982), 
10 (1983-1985), 19 (1986-1987), 21(1988-1989) and 22 (1990). It also shows the 
introduction of accelerated development area projects (AD APs) in 1981, their expansion 
from two in 1981 to three in 1984 and their merger with ADPs in 1988. The table shows 
the introduction of multi-state agricultural development projects (MS ADPs) in nine states 
in 1986 and the creation of nine more ADPs, thus bringing operational programmes to 
31 units. The programmes were reduced to 22 ADPs in 1988. 
In the case of RBDAs, the activity levels heightened in 1986, reflecting the effect of 
a new regime that took power the year before. In fact, "a new regime effect" can easily 
be seen in Annex D: at least one unit of ADP was set up by each of the regimes that 
operated in 1975-1979, 1980-1983, 1984 and 1986. 
Annex D shows that it is difficult to establish systematic relationships between capital 
allocations and units of programmes. For instance, while capital allocation rose by N487.8 
million in 1982 with four new ADPs, allocation at the peak level of programmes (31) 
was 22% of the 1982 level. On the other hand, capital allocation rose by N769.4 in 1993, 
even though the number of ADPs was unchanged. Similarly, it is difficult to establish 
systematic relationships between units of programmes and productivity (farm service 
centres, dams constructed, tractors, supply of fertilizer and feeder roads constructed) or 
between capital allocation and productivity. 
Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructures 
(DFRRI) 
The 1986 federal budget heralded the DFRRI in the following words: 
Government will establish a Directorate of Foods Roads and Rural 
Infrastructures in the Office of the President. The Directorate will work 
closely with the State Governments in order to reach the various communities 
in each of the 304 Local Government Areas throughout the country. The 
fund will be administered for stated objectives at the community levels on 
the basis of matching-grants system. It will be the cardinal element of the 
Directorate not only to effectively promote a framework for grassroots 
mobilisation but also, to mount a virile programme of developmental 
monitoring and performance evaluation. It is expected that under the 
programme, rehabilitation of 60,000 kms of rural feeder roads would be 
undertaken in 1986. (Federal Budget, 1986:11) 
The 1987 budget stated further that: 
the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures will: (a) accelerate 
its efforts to build a national network of rural feeder roads and add another 
30,000 kilometres to its original target of 60,000 kilometres; (b) implement 
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a national water supply scheme; (c) launch a national rural markets 
programme to be closely phased in with the rural feeder road programme; 
(d) launch a rural electrification programme with emphasis on rural agro-
industrialisation; and generally implement its articulated programmes in 
the fields of crop, livestock, fruits, vegetables, rural housing, rural health, 
rural education and social organisation. The Directorate will make its 
presence felt on the ground more than it has done in its foundation year; and 
has been allocated a sum of N500 million for its operations in 1987. (Federal 
Budget, 1987:17-18). 
In 1988, a presidential task force on implementation of DFRRI's functions on feeder 
roads was set up. This was followed in 1989 by the creation of a comprehensive rural 
feeder roads maintenance programme to arrest damage to and prevent eventual collapsc 
of DFRRI. The 1989 budget merged the recurrent expenditure of DFRRI with that of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to avoid duplication. In 1993, the DFRRI 
was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, yet the budgel for 
that year indicates that "it will continue to enjoy generous government backing". 
Annex D and Annex E clearly show that objectives of DFRRI and the ADPs overlap 
considerably. Without a clear delineation of areas of operations, the overlap could hardly 
facilitate efficiency or minimize government overheads. In fact, the DFRRI was even 
less likely to reduce "gross inefficiency" or overheads because its operational scope also 
overlapped with those of federal ministries (e.g., works, agriculture, water resources, 
power, industry, etc.) and public agencies like the water boards. It is not surprising 
therefore that it was eventually scrapped and merged with the federal ministry of 
agriculture. The real surprises were its creation under a regime supposedly committed to 
a lean and fitter government and the length of time it took before it was eventually 
merged. 
A summary of institutional changes 
Institutional environments are usually perceived to be stable. If the institutions supporting 
agriculture are unstable, it is highly unlikely that agricultural policies will be implemented 
effectively. A discussion of the institutions of agricultural policy is therefore useful to an 
analysis of the stability of agricultural policy. Institutional change is used here to refer to 
changes in the general rules and in economic bodies supporting agriculture. | :! 
Consequently, two types of shifts are relevant: shifts in general rules and shifts in economic 
bodies. Further, we end with a brief discussion of possible explanation of the shifts. 
Shifts in general rules 
In Section 2, we showed that a classification of agricultural policies into rigid rules, 
feedback rules and discretionary rules is useful to an analysis of stability. Annexes A--E 
ATJ ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND STABILITY OF NIGERIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 2 1 
show that agricultural policies are mainly discretionary. For instance, changes in fiscal, 
monetary and trade policy variables were announced mainly through annual budgets. In 
addition, the fiscal and monetary instruments as well as producer prices, guaranteed 
minimum prices and credit allocations do not follow either rigid or feedback rules. 
The general rules regulating the behaviour of agents directly participating in or 
servicing agriculture are categorized into four: sectoral policies or programmes, land 
reform, rules of participation, and credit programmes and allocations. Table 7a, which 
summarizes the introduction and termination of agricultural programmes, shows eight 
new sectoral programmes (1977,1980,1986,1988,1990 and 1991), four of which were 
terminated (1980, 1984, 1986 and 1993), in 17 years. Therefore, on average, one new 
sectoral programme was introduced every 21 months (1977-1991), increasing to an 
average of one in about 14 months (1986-1991). In addition, three new programmes 
terminated three old programmes: NCMS replaced NPMB, GR replaced OFN and SAP 
replaced NCMS. Further, the life of a programme ranged from three years (OFN and 
GR) to ten years (NCMS). Most significantly, sectoral programmes do not outlast regimes 
that introduce them.13 
Table 7a: Major institutional shifts and discontinuities 
Period ADP ADAP MSADAP RBDA RBRDA Sectoral/ Exogenous 
Macroeconomic shocks 
programme 
1973-75 Positive oil 
revenue shock 
Military coup 
(1975) 
1976/77-79 OFN, end of Oil boom 
NPMB, NCMS Transfer of power 
1980-83 LDP, 
RIS 
to civilians (1979) 
End of OFN, GR Negative oil shock 
External debt crisis 
Overthrow of civilian 
government 
(1983) 
1984 
1985 
1986-87 
End of GR 
Military coup 
1988 
1990 
1991 
1993 
Termination Major policy shift 
of NCMS, 
DFFRI, NNP 
NAP 
NCP 
NALDA 
End of DFRRI 
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OFN = Operation Feed the Nation 
NPMB = Nigerian Produce Marketing Boards 
NCMS = New Commodity Marketing System consisting of a price-fixing authority 
seven commodity boards 
GR = Green Revolution 
DFFRI = Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure 
NNP = National Nutritional Policy 
NAP = National Agricultural Policy 
NCP = National Commodity Programme 
NALDA = National Agricultural Land Development Agency 
Source: Annex A, B and C. 
Although there is no standard for how long programmes should last, a three-year 
period is too short for the objectives of sectoral programmes to be realized. Moreover, 
the rate at which new programmes are introduced may be too frequent to elicit desired 
responses from farmers. In fact, if farmers' expectations are as presumed by the rational 
expectation school, sectoral programmes would have no effects on farmers. In this ci mtext. 
the results of Kwanashie, Garba and Ajilima (1992), that agricultural response to policy 
is weak, appears compatible with the rational expectation thesis and it is no proof of the 
latter. However, given the level of illiteracy among farmers, it may very well be, that 
lack of information has effects similar to rational expectations. An earlier study (Garba, 
1997), for instance, found that food processors do not consciously respond to government 
policies because they have no knowledge of the policies. 
Two changes to the Indigenisation Decree are shown in Annex A. First, in 1978/79, 
agriculture was transferred from Schedule II to III to make it legal for foreigners lo own 
agricultural firms. Before the change in 1978/79, foreigners were restricted from 
participating in agriculture. The 1984 change allowed for a foreign holding of 80%, 
which was subsequently increased to 100% under the liberal regime of structural 
adjustment. Theoretically, barriers to entry are not compatible with efficiency. However, 
theory also recognizes the negative effects of market power. The issue therefore, is the 
right balance between freedom of entry, market power and the long-term interest of 
Nigeria, given that food is a powerful instrument of international politics. Now more 
than ever, the dangers of foreign unregulated participation in Nigerian agriculture must 
be taken more seriously in the light of the controversial Trade Related Intellectual Properly 
Agreement, Article 27.8 (b) on the patenting of plants. Core issues in the controversy 
such as equity, genetic erosion/genetic diversity, terminator technologies, monopolies 
and costs have significant implications for food security in Nigeria especially in the new 
millennium. 
The annex also shows that a land reform was carried out in 1977/78 through the Land 
Use Decree of 1978. The land reform was designed to make land more accessible lor 
agricultural and industrial activities. The reform has remained stable even though its 
effectiveness is the subject of intense controversy, especially now in the debate about 
true federalism. 
Annex A also shows two changes to the institutional structure providing credit to 
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farmers- The first, in 1976/77, was the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS); 
the second was the creation of Nigerian Agricultural Credit and Commerce Bank (NACB) 
in 1 T h e s e programmes have endured relative to the sectoral programmes. Similarly, 
as Table 4 showed, rules on credit allocation to agriculture were relatively stable. 
Economic bodies 
The agricultural development programmes (ADP) and River Basins Development 
Authority (RBDA) have been core economic bodies supporting and coordinating 
agricultural policies since the early 1970s. Table 7a shows the evolution of these 
organizations and the creation of others. 
The structure of ADP was changed three times (1981,1986 and 1988) and two of the 
changes were reversed. The first change (the introduction of accelerated development 
area projects—ADAP—in 1981) and the second (introduction of multi-state agricultural 
development projects—MSADAP—in 1986) were reversed in 1988 when they were 
integrated into 22 ADPs. Two other programmes, the Livestock Development Project 
(LDP) and Rural Agro-Industrial Scheme (RAIS), were introduced in 1981, but official 
records do not show when they were implemented or discontinued. These imply that 
most of the changes to ADP occurred in 1981-1988. Similarly, Table 7a also shows six 
changes in RBDA in 1984-1993 (an average of one change in 20 months). 
Overall, sectoral policies and economic bodies implementing agricultural policies 
were fluid both in absolute terms and relative to monetary policies. Land laws were the 
most stable. 
Possible reasons for the institutional changes 
Two inferences about institutional changes could be made. First, changes in the general 
rales and economic bodies supporting agriculture are frequent. Second, the changes were 
most frequent in 1984—1996. Annexes C-E show the official reasons for some of the 
policy shifts, among which were to: 
• Reduce inflation and food shortages (OFN) 
• Provide incentives to private sector and foreign participation (the changes to the 
indigenization decree, land reforms, NCMS) 
• Promote self-sufficiency (Green Revolution, DFRRI, NAP) 
• Increase export earnings (land reforms, NCMS, termination of NCMS, DFRRI) 
• Increase acreage (ADAP, MSADAP, RBRDA, NALDA) 
• Rural development (ADAP, MSADAP, RBRDA) 
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• Increase organizational efficiency (DFRRI, DFRRI monitoring units, merger of 
DFRFRI with Ministry of Agriculture) 
• Marketing efficiency (NCMS, termination of NCMS, DFRRI) 
• Provision of rural infrastructure (ADAP, MSADAP, RBRDA, DFRRI) 
If objectives were a sufficient condition, the sectoral programmes would be justified. 
For instance, Table 7b shows that food production declined at a mean annual rate of 
4.7% in 1971-1976 while the inflation rate averaged 16%. Therefore, the official reasons 
for OFN were valid. Similarly, the mean decline in food production of 3.7% and agriculture 
1.8% and the mean rise in food imports (34.9%) in 1977-1979 validate the objectives of 
GR. Programmes that sought to raise export earnings could also be justified by the low 
mean growth of exports in 1971-1985 of 1.4% relative to import growth of 25%. However, 
objectives by themselves may not justify the shifts. For instance, two contradictions 
could be identified using this criterion. First, the introduction and termination of NCMS 
were justified by the similar objectives: increased export earnings and increased market 
efficiency. Second, the creation and end of DFRRI had the same justification: efficiency. 
Table 7b: Percentage growth rates of agricultural quantities, import and exports, and the 
inflation rate (1971-1993) 
Year Crops Fish Livestock Total Import Export Inflation 
1971-76 -4.7 4.9 0.5 -3.5 45.9 11.1 16.0 
1977-79 -3.7 2.6 3.2 -1.8 34.9 10.4 14.6 
1980-85 2.5 -11.2 4.0 2.2 -1.3 -12.7 17.8 
1986-93 10.3 -1.6 2.0 8.0 8.5 -1.0 30.5 
1971-93 2.5 -1.9 2.3 2.2 19.1 0.6 21.3 
Source: Computed from Central Bank (1993; 1977-1993). 
The information in this study is insufficient to test the proposition that the behaviour 
of agricultural output, export earnings and prices causes institutional shifts. However. 
Table 7a shows strong support for the proposition: in general, institutional change is 
associated with political change. For instance, after each of the four major political shocks, 
a programme is terminated and at least one new one introduced. Further, the period with 
the most new programmes coincided with the period of both a major policy shift and a 
major political shock. However, because the creation of more programmes was 
incompatible with a smaller government as required by the policy shift, the "political 
effect" appears to have been the dominant catalyst. 
4. Implementation deviations of agricultural 
policies 
This is the first of a two-part evaluation of the credibility of agricultural policies. The 
focus on this section is on estimates of implementation deviation, while the next section 
investigates the problem of instability. Section 2 discussed how we measured 
implementation deviation; here we report the estimates and discuss them. 
In all, we estimated implementation deviations for ten policy variables grouped into 
two fiscal allocations to agriculture and agricultural programmes and sectoral credit 
allocation to agriculture. The first group of fiscal policy variables has eight variables 
while the second (monetary policy) had two. For each variable, we report period averages, 
spread and standard deviations. In addition, we report the pattern of over- and 
undershooting to supplement the reported estimates of implementation deviations. Thus, 
in addition to inferences about implementation deviation, we also provide information 
on volatility of implementation. 
Plan and budget allocations to agriculture and 
to the RBDAs 
Implementation deviations were computed for eight fiscal policy variables. Four of the 
policy variables comprise capital allocations to agriculture in the second and third plans 
(1971-1979) and current, capital and total allocations to agriculture in the federal budgets 
of 1977-1993. The other policy variables are shares of current, capital and total budget 
allocations to agriculture, and capital allocations to the RBRDAs in 1981-1993. 
Table 8 summarizes the result for the eight variables. Three main points are indicated 
by the results: First, the results suggest that the proposition by private agents that 
government does not keep its word is valid. For instance, implementation deviation for 
plan allocation ranges from -37.0% to 428.5%, with a period average of 54.9%. Similarly, 
current, capital and total allocations to agriculture in the budget show similar ranges of 
implementation deviations. However, the period average for capital allocation is very 
small (0.5%) in absolute terms and relative to those for current (45.5%), total (55.9%) 
and capital allocations to RBDAs (-21.3%). The implementation deviations for 
expenditure shares also have wide ranges, although the mean averages for current and 
capital allocations are small (-5.5% and 4.1%, respectively). 
2 6 RESEARCH PAPER -JQI 
Figure 5a: Capital expenditure on agriculture (plan allocations and actual expenditures) 
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Table 8: Summary descriptive statistics of the implementation deviation of selected 
agricultural policies (%) 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Period 
Capital (plan) 54.9 428.5 -37.0 147.0 1971-79 
Capital (budget) 0.5 121.1 -69.5 49.7 1977-03 
Current (budget) 45.5 148.6 -36.4 47.8 1977-93 
Total (budget) 4.4 112.4 -66.3 48.6 1977-93 
Current (shares) 4.1 71.7 -61.7 43.2 1977-93 
Capital (shares) -5.5 64.8 -72.1 45.5 1977-93 
Total (shares) 71.2 423.0 -52.8 115.8 1977-93 
RBRDAs -21.3 48.7 -49.8 27.6 1977-93 
Commercial banks -24.4 15.4 -22.3 11.6 1977-93 
Merchant banks 12.2 43.8 -21.9 26.9 1977-93 
Source: Author's estimates 
It is worth noting that the period average of implementation deviation is smallest in 
the case of budget capital allocation and highest in the case of total expenditure shares. 
In addition, about 75% of the plan and budget allocation variables have implementation 
deviations greater than 5%.14 Second, of the eight fiscal policy variables, only two 
(expenditure shares of capital allocations and capital allocations to RBDAs) have negative 
period average deviations. For the other six, the results indicate a tendency to overshoot 
planned or budget targets. 
Third, the values of the standard deviation of the percentage implementation deviations 
show substantial degrees of volatility. Figures 5b, 6b, 7b, 8b, 9b, 10b, 1 lb and 12 clearly 
show the volatility of the implementation deviations. Figures 5a, 6a, 7a, 8a, 9a, 10a, 11a 
and 12 show the two series used in computing the percentage implementation deviation 
and are placed alongside the respective implementation deviation so that they can be 
compared. 
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Figure 
5b: Implementation deviation of planned capital expenditure on agriculture, 1971-
1979(%) 
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Figure 6a: Capital expenditure on agriculture (budget allocations and actual 
expenditures), 1977-1993 (N million) 
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Figure 6b: Implementation deviation of capital allocations to agriculture, 1977-1993 (%) 
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Figure 7a: Current expenditure on agriculture (budget allocations and actual 
expenditures), 1977-1993 (N million) 
actual budget 
Figure 7b: Implementation deviation of current allocations to agriculture, 1977-1993 (%) 
actual from budg el 
Figure 8a: Total expenditure on agriculture (budget allocations and actual expenditures), 
1977-1993 (N million) 
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Figure 8b: Implementation deviation of total allocations to agriculture, 1977-1993 (%) 
Figure 9a: Share of agriculture infederal current expenditure (budget and actual) 
Figure 9b: Implementation deviation of relative shares of agriculture in total current 
allocations, 1977-1993 (%) 
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Figure 10a: Share of agriculture in federal capital expenditure (budget and actual) ( % ) 
Figure 10b: Implementation deviation of relative shares of agriculture in total capital 
allocations, 1977-1993 (%) 
Figure 11a: Share of agriculture in total federal expenditure (budget and actual). 1977-
1993(%) ' 
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Figure 11b: Implementation deviation of relative shares of agriculture in total 
allocations,! 977-1993 (%) 
Figure 12: % Implementation deviation (capital allocations to RBRDAs), 1981-1993 (N m 
bn) 
Table 9 reveals a pattern of implementation deviations that sheds more light on the 
volatility that period averages conceal. First, Table 9 clearly shows that there are no 
occurrences of zero percentage deviation for any case or year. Therefore, Table 9 also 
supports the position that the government does not keep its word. Second, most of the 
undershooting occurred before 1987 and most of the overshooting occurred after 1986. 
Third, four fiscal policy variables overshot target levels more often while the other four 
had more occurrences of undershooting. 
Sectoral credit allocation to agriculture 
The last two rows of Table 8 show the results for the implementation deviation for the 
two monetary policy variables, commercial bank sectoral credit allocations to agriculture 
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Table 9: Pattern of the implementation deviation of selected agricultural policies (%) 
Variable Undershooting Zero Overshooting Number of Period with most Period with most 
deviation observations undershooting overshootin 
Capital (plan) 5 (56%) 0 4 (44%) 9 2nd plan (1970-74) 3rd plan (1975-79) 
Capital 8 (47%) 0 9 (53%) 17 1977-81 1986-93 
Current 3(18%) 0 14(82%) 17 1979-82 1983-93 
Total 7(41%) 0 10(59%) 17 1978-86 1987-93 
Current 10(59%) 0 7(41%) 17 1978-86 1987-93 
Capital 9 (53%) 0 8 (47%) 17 1979-86 1987-93 
Total 4 (24%) 0 13(76%) 17 1982-86 1977-81 and 1987-92 
RBRDAs 10(91%) 0 1 (9%) 11 1981-93 
Commercial 7 (54%) 0 6 (46%) 13 1981-87 1988-93 
banks 
Merchant 6 (46%) 0 7 (54%) 13 1981-84 1988-92 
banks 
Source: Author's estimates. 
and merchant bank lending to agriculture. Whereas actual commercial bank sectoral 
credit allocations to agriculture undershot target levels by a period average of 24.4%, 
merchant banks overshot their lending limits by 12.2%. The results imply that commercial 
banks on the average were not bound by government regulations on minimum sectoral 
allocations to agriculture while merchant banks were. 
Further, Table 9 shows that commercial banks undershot approved lending rates 9 out 
of 13 times (54%) while merchant banks undershot approved lending rates 8 out of 13 
times or 46% of the time in 1981-1993. The table also shows that most of the 
undershooting for commercial and merchant banks occurred in 1981-1987 and 1981— 
1984, respectively, while most of the overshooting occurred in 1988-1993 and 1988— 
1992, respectively. These imply that neither bank type was always bound by government 
regulations on sectoral lending. 
Figure 13a shows the approved and actual lending rates for both while Figure 13b 
shows the time paths of the percentage implementation deviation for approved commercial 
and merchant bank sectoral credit allocations. It shows that they are volatile but less so 
than budget allocation variables. 
Overall, three main deductions are indicated. First, government does not keep its 
word; it is also not able, on average, to induce or compel the organized private financial 
sector to meet its minimum approved lending to agriculture. Second, there is a noticeable 
shift in the direction of implementation in 1986: occurrence of undershooting of both 
fiscal and monetary targets coincided with the pre-adjustment era, while the overshooting 
coincided with the adjustment era. Third, following from the second, the direction of 
overshooting appears to be sensitive to changes in political and policy regimes. 
However, it is not possible to draw strong conclusions about credibility of the observed 
tendency for fiscal over- and undershootings. This is because we have not formulated a 
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13a: Approved and actual lending to agriculture (% of total lending) 
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Figure 13b: Implementation deviation lending to agriculture, 1981-1993 (%) 
macroeconomic model required for a more rigorous analysis of the credibility of the 
agricultural policy regime. However, while some implementation deviation may be 
compatible with credible policy, a persistent and non-marginal implementation deviation 
could hardly be compatible with a credible policy regime. 
5. Stability of agricultural policies 
The historical overview of agricultural policy reveals frequent changes, and discontinuities 
in general rules and economic bodies supporting agriculture are frequent. It also showed 
that the discontinuities heightened under the adjustment period. In addition, the 
discontinuities and frequency of new programmes are linked to political changes. At 
this stage therefore it is plausible to infer that the frequent changes and discontinuities 
are indicative of unstable policy regimes. However, further investigation of the volatility 
of the growth rates of important agricultural policy variables is useful to shed more light 
and provide more evidence.15 Therefore, we report and discuss measures of volatility for 
selected price, fiscal and monetary policy variables as a complement to the information 
revealed by the tables. 
Selected indicators of agricultural policy 
Three groups of indicators are in the selection: prices, expenditure on agriculture and 
credit to agriculture. These variables are indicators of price, fiscal and monetary policies. 
We selected six prices consisting of three major tradeables (cocoa, groundnuts and palm 
kernel) and three non-tradeables with broad national spreads (maize, rice and yams). 
The expenditure on agriculture consists of two broad categories: budget allocations 
and actual expenditures. In addition, we disaggregated both into capital and current and 
distinguish between nominal and "real" expenditure. We defined real expenditure as 
nominal expenditure deflated by the naira/US$ exchange rate. Two assumptions underlie 
the choice of the exchange rate as deflator. First, a significant proportion of capital 
expenditure on agriculture is capital goods imports. Second, domestic price is a direct 
function of the exchange rate.16 Further we investigated the volatility of budget and 
actual allocations because of the significant implementation deviation revealed by Section 
4. Therefore, it is possible to find out if their volatility is different. Similarly, the distinction 
between nominal and real makes it possible to investigate the proposition that their 
volatility is different. 
The credit variables are approved allocations to agriculture (commercial banks and 
merchant banks); and loans to agriculture (commercial banks and merchant banks). 
The study uses two methods to investigate the volatility of the variables. First, we 
compute, graph and analyse the growth rates of the variables. Second, we compute and 
analyse the standard deviations of the "growth series". For all groups of series, we 
compute and analyse short-run variability and compare with long-run variability. The 
observed association between institutional change and political change informs this. 
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Measures and analysis of volatility 
prices 
Figure 14a shows the graphs of the growth rates of the selected crops plotted against 
time. Table 10, on the other hand, shows the mean and standard deviations of the growth 
series for the period 1971-1989 and four sub-periods: 1971-1976; 1977-1979; 1980-
1985 and 1986-1989. It is important to appreciate that the sample period covers: 
. The termination of NPMB (Nigerian Produce Marketing Boards) 
• Its replacement by NCMS (new commodity marketing system consisting of a Price 
Fixing Authority and seven commodity boards) 
• The termination of NCMS, introduction and termination of OFN (Operation Feed 
the Nation) and GR (Green Revolution) 
• The operations of DFFRI (Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure) 
The appreciation is important to perceiving the subsamples as indicators of the 
institutional changes and the four political changes that occurred within the period. 
The table and the graphs show that all the commodities exhibit long-term volatility. 
The volatility indicators range from 31.3% (yams) to 247.2% (rice) for non-tradeables 
and from 38.2% (palm kernel) to 76.3% (groundnuts) for tradeables. Further, the 
subsample indicators show that the subperiod 1986-1989 is the most volatile for all 
three tradeables and for two non-tradeables (yams and rice). On the other hand, the 
subperiod 1977-1979 is the most stable for all three non-tradeables and two tradeables 
(groundnut and palm kernel). Cocoa was most stable in 1980-1985 and rice was most 
unstable in 1980-1985 (the graph for rice in Figure 14a shows that this was caused by 
the sharp increase of 1981). 
Table 10: Volatility indicators for growth rates of selected commodity prices, 1971-1989 (%) 
1971 -76 1977--79 1980-85 1986-89 1971 -89 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Cocoa 18.5 36.4 24.2 28.8 3.9 4.2 73.6 61.6 26.3 42.2 
Groundnuts 26.5 17.8 12.0 7.8 40.1 65.4 67.4 156.9 37.1 76.3 
Palm kernel 22.8 48.6 6.7 11.5 16.7 28.8 32.5 54.0 20.4 38.2 
Maize 21.2 32.4 15.9 17.3 26.4 33.5 46.3 117.6 27.3 55.3 
Rice 19.9 28.8 3.4 24.8 181.4 442.9 31.7 41.9 70.8 247.2 
Yams 14.1 35.6 35.5 19.0 10.3 23.9 33.5 43.2 20.4 31.3 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1970-1989). 
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Figure 14a: Growth rates of selected commodity prices, 1971-1989 (%) 
Expenditure on agriculture 
Figures 14b and 14c show, respectively, the graphs of the growth rates of budget and 
actual expenditure plotted against time. The former is for the sample period 1978-1993 
and the latter is for the sample period 1971-1993. The sample periods reflect data 
availability. To make a comparable analysis, the computed indicators of variability in 
Tables 11 (budget allocations) and 12 (actual expenditure) have the same sample periods. 
Four general observations could be made from the figures (14b and 14c) and (11 and 
12). First, budget allocation (86.8% to 135.4%) and actual expenditure (93.1% to 105.9%) 
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Figure 14b: Growth rates of budget allocations to agriculture (1978-1993) 
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exhibit long-run volatility. Second, budget allocations are less volatile than actual 
expenditures except in the case of current expenditures. This is reasonable since actual 
expenditures depend on actual government revenue, which is very sensitive to movements 
in actual oil revenue. Third, nominal and real budget allocations exhibit similar patterns 
of volatility but real expenditure and nominal expenditures have slightly different patterns. 
For instance, while real current expenditure is less volatile than real capital expenditure, 
nominal current expenditure is more volatile than nominal capital expenditure. Fourth, 
current expenditure (budget and actual) is the most volatile in the long term. 
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Table 11: Volatility indicators for growth rates of budget allocation to agriculture, 1978-
1993(%) 
1978--79 1980-83 1984--85 1986--93 1978--93 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Capital3 86.2 91.2 40.3 26.8 105.8 260.9 30.9 71.5 49.5 91.8 
Current3 37.6 51.7 -3.6 8.0 5.8 8.7 100.2 183.8 54.6 135.4 
Total3 79.5 86.3 37.5 25.1 90.2 235.7 40.7 87.9 50.9 91.4 
Capital" 91.0 86.8 33.2 26.6 78.3 222.7 -4.3 68.7 27.3 87.1 
Current" 41.4 47.8 -8.5 11.3 -2.4 16.8 56.3 174.7 30.9 123.9 
Total" 84.2 82.0 30.4 24.6 65.0 200.0 4.5 85.0 28.5 86.8 
a Nominal 
b. Nominal deflated by the exchange rate. 
Source: Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria (1993,1977-1993). 
Table 12: Volatility indicators for growth rates of actual allocation to agriculture, 
1978-1993(%) 
1978-79 1980-83 1984-85 1986-93 1978-93 
Mean s. d. Mean s. d. Mean s. d. Mean s. d. mean s. d. 
Capital3 -5.7 22.1 109.1 162.0 -24.8 45.6 36.5 64.4 41.7 97.3 
Current3 -22.4 40.7 37.0 86.2 n1.9 0.6 82.3 127.5 47.3 104.1 
Total3 -12.0 7.7 96.5 146.7 -23..7 42.4 46.0 72.9 42.7 93.1 
Capital" -1.9 26.8 109.4 184.0 -32.7 35.6 -1.5 56.8 22.3 105.9 
Current" -20.5 38.9 36.2 102.0 -9.8 7.6 39.7 124.8 25.1 100.2 
Total" -8.7 11.6 96.7 168.0 -31.6 32.6 7.0 69.0 22.6 100.3 
Source: Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria (1993,1977-1993). 
Figure 14b and Table 11 reveal different intensities of short-run volatility for budget 
allocations and its components. For instance, budget allocations were least volatile in 
1980-1983, whereas total and capital allocations were most volatile in 1984-1985. 
However, budget allocation was most volatile in 1986-1993. It follows, therefore, that 
much of the long-run volatility of current budget allocations was due to its heightened 
volatility in the 1986-1993 period. 
Similarly, Figure 14c and Table 12 reveal different intensities of short-run volatility 
for actual expenditure and its components. Total and capital expenditure were least volatile 
in 1978-1979 while current expenditure was least volatile in 1984-1985. Interestingly, 
both total and capital expenditure were most volatile in 1980-1983 when corresponding 
budget allocations were least volatile. However, the period of greatest volatility was the 
same for both current expenditure and current budget allocations (1986-1993). 
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Figure 14c: Growth rates of actual expenditure on agriculture (1971-1993) 
Credit allocation and bank lending to agriculture 
The growth rates of credit allocations and bank lending to agriculture are shown in Figure 
14d, while their mean and standard deviations are summarized in Table 13. The graphs 
and table show that approved allocation to agriculture for commercial banks is relatively 
stable, while commercial bank lending is volatile. Second, approved allocation and lending 
of merchant banks is more volatile in 1986-1993 than in 1982-1985, but approved 
allocation and lending bycommercial banks is more volatile in 1978-1985 than in 1986-
1993. 
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Figure 14d: Growth rates of approved allocations and bank lending to agriculture (1978-
1993) 
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Table 13: Volatility indicators for approved credit and bank lending to agriculture, 
1978-1993 (%) 
1978-85 1986-93 1978-89 
Mean s. d. Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
Approved allocations to agriculture (commercial banks) 9.8 14.0 3.1 8.8 6.5 4.4 
Approved allocations to agriculture (merchant banks) 0.41 9.8 8.3 23.6 11.8 17.9 
Lending to agriculture (commercial banks) 33.2 16.5 30.7 13.4 32.0 48.1 
Lending to agriculture (merchant banks) 43.3a 6.8a 50.5 24.8 48.1 20.4 
a This applies to 1982-1985. 
Source: Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria (1993,1977-1993). 
6. Conclusion 
The study achieved three main objectives. First, it collected, organized and presented a 
comprehensive documentation of agricultural policies for 1976-1993. Second, it 
computed and analysed implementation deviation for ten agricultural policy variables, 
eight of which are fiscal and two monetary. Third, it identified and analysed discontinuities 
in agricultural policies. In addition, it computed volatility measures for ten agricultural 
policy instruments and six regulated commodity prices. 
The estimates of implementation deviation indicate consequential over- and 
undershooting of policy targets. The results show that the implementation deviation was 
persistent and volatile in addition to being consequential. Therefore, the concern that 
private agents have about government not keeping its word is legitimate. Similarly, their 
concern about policy discontinuities is also valid. For instance, the volatility measures 
indicate that all variables exhibit consequential long-run volatility, although the degree 
and patterns of short-run volatility differed. 
In general, volatility was most intense for most policy variables in the structural 
adjustment period, implying that agricultural policies were relatively more stable before 
than after adjustment. This suggests that the major policy shift of 1985/86 heightened 
policy instability. However, political instability predated structural adjustment and could 
be associated with long-term instability of agricultural policies. We found that no 
agricultural programmes outlived the political regimes that introduced them, while each 
new regime put in place new programmes. Further, while the official rationales for the 
changes suggest that even though some of the changes could be justified by the behaviour 
of agricultural output, productivity, prices and export revenue, political instability seems 
to be the driving force. 
Finally, even without a comprehensive evaluation of the credibility of agricultural 
policies, it hardly seems likely that a policy regime could be credible when implementation 
deviations are consequential, persistent and volatile and policy variables exhibit long-
term volatility. Therefore, the partial assessment notwithstanding, the effects of political 
instability and structural adjustment on the credibility of agricultural policies are worthy 
of further investigations. We choose to recommend further studies rather than simple 
inferences from the results in recognition of the limits of recommendations that are neither 
feasible nor sufficiently justified. For instance, to recommend minimizing political 
instability as a way to reduce long-term volatility of agricultural policies is pointless 
without explaining political instability and establishing more rigorously the connection 
between political and policy instabilities. Similarly, to assert that structural adjustment 
should be reversed to improve credibility of agricultural policies would lack credibility 
if we have not established rigorously how adjustment is causal to the heightened volatility 
of agricultural policies. 
Notes 
1. Though these statements were made with specific reference to the 1996 budgets, 
newspaper reports of the response of private economic agents to previous budgets 
reveal similar comments. 
2. Mr. Kolade's statement and those of Dr. Adegbite and Mr. Peterside below were 
reported by The Guardian, Monday, 19 February 1996. 
3. The consensus of some financial operators on the 1996 budget when they were 
interviewed by The Guardian as reported in its edition of Monday, 19 February 1996. 
4. Mr Akindele's statement and those of Mr. Akingbola and Mr. Dipo Aina were reported 
by The Guardian, Sunday, 18 February 1996. 
5. Mr Peterside indicates that policy shifts are frequent while Mr Erasmus reveals that 
policy shifts make private sector economic planning difficult and that a stable public 
policy regime is desirable to improvements in the private sector activities. 
6. Thus, unlike World Bank (1994), policy performance is not evaluated by some 
exogenously determined policy targets but simply by the deviation between what 
government announces and what it actually does. 
7. We do not yet know how many agricultural policy documents have been released; 
we would find out from the federal Ministry of Agriculture in the course of the study. 
8. The concept of policy stability as used in this study is not precisely the same as the 
concept of stability in macroeconomic or general equilibrium analysis where it is 
used "to refer to the extent to which an equilibrium price or set of prices will be 
secured despite any 'shocks' to the system which temporarily move prices away 
from its equilibrium level" (Pearce, 1983). The partial and general equilibrium 
analysis would have been strictly relevant if we sought "to ascertain whether, and 
under what conditions, the variables present in a given economic model converge 
over time to their respective equilibrium values" as stability analyses of models seek 
to do (Gondolfo, 1985: 395). 
9. Under microeconomic and general equilibrium analysis we would have needed to 
establish the following conditions for stability: 
lim Y(t) =Y.e,i = 1,2, ,n 
t6% 
lim [Y.(T) - Yje] = 0, i=l,2, ,n 
16% 
10. Though the structural adjustment programme is a comprehensive economic 
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programme, agricultural policy is an important part of it. 
11. The NCMS Green Revolution (GR) and accelerated development area project (ADAP) 
are attributable to political changes. 
12. Unlike North (1992), the study does not distinguish institutions from organizations. 
This assumes that players and rules converge if power is centralized. 
13. The NCMS is the only exception. 
14. This is computed as six divided by eight multiplied by 100%. 
15. Further analysis of stability may focus on policy reaction functions to ensure that 
policy changes are not erroneously interpreted as indicators of instability. Clearly, 
there is value added in this type of extension especially in economies where policy 
making is intertemporal, largely autonomous and with stable policy institutions. 
However, where the policy institution is unstable and policy making is evidently 
discontinuous, the chances of erroneous interpretation are very limited and the value 
addition of analytical rigour may not justify it. Besides, regardless of its underlying 
causes, frequent change in policy is not compatible with a stable policy environment 
under which private enterprise thrives. 
16. A simple test of this assumption supports it. The result is: CPN= 93.3 +142.5ERN. 
The respective t-statistics are 2.0 (intercept) and 21.2 (slope coefficient). The adjusted 
R-square is 0.95, the D.W. 1.96 and the sample period is 1970-1993. 
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Annex A: Agricultural policies in federal budgets: 1976/77-1996 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
1976/77 i -reduce cost of food to (a) - Agricultural Development Programs (ADP) 
cut inflation - River Basins Development Authority 
ii -increase food production (RBDA) 
iii -maximize contribution 
of cash crops and ensure 
adequate income to 
farmers 
(b) - Operation feed the nation to be launched 
- improvement in distribution facilities to facilitate easy access 
to cheap fertilisers by farmers 
-efforts to provide simple and standardised implements to farmers 
-maintenance facilities to be set up at strategic places 
-increase in the provision of trained manpower for large scale irrigation 
-increase in the supply of pest control equipment and pesticides 
-Agricultural credit guarantee scheme 
(c) -interest rates fixed at between 6-8% 
(d) -Import duty relief for agricultural machineries, selected food 
products, trucks, lorries and spareparts 
1977/78 iv-higher export earnings (a) -ADP 
v -increase in supply of 
food and agricultural 
raw materials 
-RBDA 
-75% fertilizer subsidy 
(b) -Operation feed the nation to be pursued 
with even more vigour 
-Agricultural credit guarantee scheme 
(d) -Import duty relief for agricultural machinery, 
selected food products, trucks, lorries 
and spare parts 
(a) -5 years tax relief 
(b) -provision of land by States to Nigerians and 
non-Nigerians interested in large-scale farming 
(d) -duty free imports of raw materials for livestock feeds and all 
agricultural machines used for agro-allied processing 
-ban on food imports (except chocolates and chocolate preparations) 
1978/79 i -control of inflation 
i -increase food 
production 
(a) -ADP 
-RBDA 
-75% fertiliser subsidy 
(a) -additional investment allowance of 10% on all capital 
on plant and equipment 
-indefinite carry forward of losses 
Annex A continued.. 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
vi -improve food storage 
vii -encourage foreign 
-investment in 
agriculture 
-5 years tax holidays 
(b) -Operation feed the nation to be pursued 
with even more vigour 
-Agricultural credit guarantee scheme 
(d) -Import duty relief for agricultural machineries, 
selected food products, trucks, 
lorries and spare parts 
1979/80 ix -increase in production 
(400,000 tonnes of 
assorted grains) 
x -integrated rural 
development 
xi -improvement in the 
quantity and quality of 
livestock and livestock 
products 
(a) -ADP 
-RBDA 
-75% fertilizer subsidy 
-5-year tax holidays 
(b) -Operation feed the nation to be pursued 
with even more vigour 
-Agricultural credit guarantee scheme 
(d) -Import duty relief for agricultural machineries^ 
selected food products, trucks, lorries 
and spare parts 
-interest payable on agricultural loans to enjoy special 
exemption from taxation 
-capital allowances to firms leasing agricultural implements 
(b) -transfer of agriculture from schedule II to schedule III 
-treatment of agriculture, its processing and marketing as 
preferred activities in credit allocations 
(d) -re-exports of imported food banned 
(a) -contract for supply of 400,000 tons of assorted 
types of fertilizer to farmers awarded 
(b) -proposal to establish a National Centre for Agricultural 
Mechanisation made in 1978/79 to get off the ground 
-investing in manufacturing simple agricultural 
machines and implements 
-1400 hectares for cultivation of cash crops 
-establishment of large-scale agricultural farms 
of 4000 hectares in all states 
-irrigation schemes in Bakalori, Lake Chad Basin 
and Kano River to irrigate 6000,5000 and 
7000 hectares of land, respectively 
-integrated rural development schemes 
-2 million hectares of land acquired 
(d) -wheat, barley, oats, rice, buckwheat, millet, canary seed, 
grain sorghum, and other cereals, cereal flour, butter, 
_ cheese and frozen beef placed under import licence 
Annex A continued.... 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained 
1980 i -reduction in inflation 
xii -increase in the 
availability of essential 
food items to the 
generality of our people 
same as 1979/80 
Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
-machinery for irrigation to be imported duty free 
-fresh fish and shrimps caught and landed in Nigeria by 
Nigerian-owned vessels to attract zero duties while 
those landed by foreign vessels would attract 2k per kg 
duty and all others would attract 4k per kg duty 
(d) -import duty on fishing vessels abolished 
1981 
1982 
1983 
xiii -self-sufficiency in 
food by 1985 
(a) -ADP 
-RBDA 
-green revolution programme 
xiv -sustain momentum of (a) -ADP 
boost in production of 
rice and fish 
iv -export earnings 
xiii -self-sufficiency in 
food 
xiv -reduction in food 
imports 
-RBDA 
-green revolution programme 
(a) -ADP 
-RBDA 
-green revolution programme 
(a) 760 boreholes to be sunk 
(b) -development of grandparent stock for domestic 
production of day-old chicks 
-establishment of grazing reserves for nomadic herders 
and local production of livestock feeds 
-fishing terminals at Ondo, Rivers and Cross Rivers 
States to be commissioned 
Annex A continued.. 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained P o l i c y changes or Extension to past policies 
-efforts to be made to duplicate pilot schemes in 
rural integrated agricultural development projects 
(c) -Nigerian Agricultural and Commerce Bank to borrow 
N100 million for provision of credit to farmers 
1984 xiv -reduction in food (a) -ADP /=i won m;n- •• . 
i m p 0 r t s (a) -N20 million allocated for emergency water supply, supplem 
xv -revival of agriculture ^ ^ r e p a i > S ° f a g r i c u l t u r a l t r a c t o r s a n d machinery 
xvi -employment of labour (d) -Import duty relief for agricultural machineries, (b) -states to set up farm settlements 
selected food products, trucks, lorries -RBDA renamed River Basins and Rural Development 
and spare parts Authorities (RBRDA); to drive agricultural policies and to add 
the responsibility of rural development to those of RBDA 
-small farmers to have easier access to credit, higher 
producer prices and more efficient provision of inputs 
-proposal to amend JMEPD to allow foreigners to 
own more than 80% of large farm projects 
-simplification of land acquisition 
-liberalisation of credit to farming 
(d) -duties on selected agricultural imports raised 
-duties on wheat and tea reduced 
1985 v -provision of food and (a) -ADP , . ,, 
raw materials -RBRDA ( > ° 1 5 % ° f a l l o c a t l o n s t 0 agriculture to ADPS 
(b) -comprehensive insurance scheme to be established to 
protect agricultural produce against all forms of hazards 
-River Basins and Development Authorities to assume full 
responsibility for all federally funded water resource projects. 
Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
They are to cease direct production to concentrate on 
extension sen/ices to indvidual farmers 
(c) lending institutions to grant enhanced moratorium on 
agricultural loans 
Annex A continued.... 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained 
1986 xvii -accelerated drive (a) -ADPs 
towards self-sufficiency 
in the production of rice 
and maize 
xviii -adequate production (b) ban on rice and maize imports 
of yams, cassava, cocoa, 
sorghum and millet 
xix -reduced import 
dependency throuhg 
groundnut, cotton, cocoa 
and palm oil production 
xx -reduced post harvest 
losses 
xxi -increased export 
earnings to diversify 
foreign exchange 
earnings and raise rural 
employment 
xxii -self-sufficiency in 
food in two years 
xxiii -reduction in rural-
urban welfare gap 
(b) -DFRRI (with a budget of N450 million) to construct 
60,000km of rural feeder roads 
-national on-farm storage programme to be launched 
-focus on small-scale farmers as the centrepiece of food-
and fibre production 
-disengagement from direct production and distribution of 
farm produce 
-federal support in policy formulation and coordination 
but state and local government implementation 
-special care to prevent leakages 
-national rice production and distribution and national maize 
production and distribution programmes to be implemented 
-ADPs to take over the agricultural functions of RBRDAS 
and work alongside local government councils 
-RBRDA to focus on water resource development 
-review of the 18 Agricultural Research Centres so that each 
could begin establishing an extensive network of on-farm 
adaptive research centres in different ecological zones 
-National Seeds Service to be vastly strengthened in the areas 
of quality control and seed certification 
-new farm mechanization policy that emphasizes development 
of appropriate small-scale mechanical technologiesto be articulate! 
-commercialization of fertilizer procurement and distribution 
Annex A continued.. 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
-National Grains Board to build up strategic buffer stock 
of not less than 50,000 metric tonnes 
-Food Market Information Dissemination Service to be launched 
to further integrate the various segments of the Nigerian food market 
-a Rural Development Decree to provide for the revitalization 
and transformation of Nigeria's rural sector to reduce 
rural-urban welfare gap 
(c) -a new farm credit policy to be formulated to liberalize 
access to farm credit 
-at least 15% of commercial banks to be allocated to 
agriculture (grains, 50%; livestock, 15%; others, 35%) 
(d) -pesticide control decree to be promulgated 
-ban on import of vegetable oil, day-old chicks and 
hatching eggs, stock fish 
-Export Promotion Council to encourage and facilitate 
export of all forms of agricultural produce 
1987 -not stated -all programmes in 1986 (a) -N500 million allocated to DFRRI to add 30,000km of feeder roads 
to the 60,000km in 1986; implement a national rural water supply 
scheme, launch a rural rural market programme and rural 
electrification programme and implement its articulated programme 
in crop,livestock, fruits, vegetables, rural housing, rural health, rural 
education and social organization 
(b) -National Food Security and Storage system to create 500,000 tonnes 
Annex A continued.... 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained 
1988 xx -prevention of post (a) -ADP 
harvest losses -DFRRI 
xxiv -encouragement of 
private sector, large and 
medium size businesses 
to embark on hybrid seed 
multiplication 
xxv -fight against desertification 
xxvi -cost effectiveness and 
accountability in the 
activities of DFRRI 
1989 i -reduction in high food (a) -ADP 
prices -DFRRI 
xxvii -dramatically raised 
farm productivity 
xxviii -encouragement 
of private commodity traders to 
assume responsibility for 
buffer stock 
Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
farm and on-farm storage capacity 
-National Nutritional Policy to be formulated 
-the Food Market Information Dissemination Service to 
be developed to provide the Nigerian food system with information 
on inventories and stocks, market trends, spot and future prices 
(c) -a new National Small Farmers Credit Programme to bring seasonal 
credit to the grassroots 
(b) -research institutes to facilitate second objective 
-promotion of tree nurseries and tree planting exercises 
-promote wood imports 
-full monitoring and auditing of DFRRI 
(d) -zero duty on fish caught by Nigerian and transported 
by Nigerian vessels 
(a) -N2 million allocated to Nigerian Stored Products Research 
Institute for design and fabrication of prototype small-scale 
storage facilities and the development of a cadre 
of storage extension workers 
-50% increase in the price of fertilizer 
(b) -clear, stable and consistent price signals 
-appropriate financial and institutional support 
-National on-farm adaptive research trials 
Annex A continued.. 
Year Policy Objectives Policies Retained Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
-fertilizer procurement and distribution to be privatized in 1990/91 
-free inter-state flow of produce 
-Universities of agriculture to be funded by the Ministry of Agriculture 
from 1990 
(b) -import of poultry products, fruits and vegetables, vegetable oil, 
rice and rice products, wheat, and wheat products 
1990 i -reduction in food prices 
xx -cutback in post 
-harvest losses 
xxix -accelerated production 
of food consumed by low and 
middle income group 
xxx -replacement of low 
productivity agriculture 
with high productivity 
agriculture 
xxxi -reduction of high cost 
of food and fibre production 
(a) -ADP (a) -National Agricultural Land Development Authority 
-DFRRI (gains to be consolidated) (NALDA) to be established 
-research extension service linkage to be strengthened 
-National Commission for Women to be strengthened 
-establishment of community banks to be pursued with outmost vigour 
-pronouncement on privatization of fertilizer (in 1978 budget) to be 
vigourously pursued 
-new programme on small and medium scale storage facilities 
(a) -ADP (a) -link between DFRRI's rural feeder roads programme with national 
-DFRRI (gains to be consolidated) food and agriculture priorities 
-National Commodity Programmes to be launched for accelerated 
food production, processing and distribution 
-necessary machinery for privatizing fertilizer procurement and 
distribution 
-subsidy and importation of fertilizer 
-NAFCON to establish fertilizer depots in different 
zones in the country 
1991 xxxii -sustained tempo 
of food and agriculture 
xxxiii -increased acreage 
under cultivation 
xxx -increased productivity 
of agriculture 
xxxiv -democratized and 
liberalized farm credit 
Annex A continued.... 
Year 
1992 
1993 
Policy Objectives Policies Retained Policy Changes or Extension to past policies 
xxxv -access to adequate (a) -ADP 
food and fibre at affordable 
prices 
xxxvi—attainment of national 
food security 
xxx -higher productivity 
i -reduced food prices 
ii -increased food 
production 
xxxvii —development of rural 
infrastructure 
xxxvi -guaranteed food 
security 
-DFRRI (to continue to enjoy 
substantial government support) 
-NALDA (appropriate funds to be 
released in 1992, board was 
inaugurated in May 1991) 
-same as 1992 apart from DFRRI 
to be launched in 1991 
(b) -ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme 
(c) -tax exemption on agricultural loans 
(a) -assistance to FOFAN to sharply focus their interest and 
advocacy roles 
-reform of institutional arrangement for agricultural research and 
extension to raise productivity 
-monitoring of ECOWAS demand on Nigerian agriculture and 
formulation of appropriate policy response 
(a) -DFRRI to be merged with the Ministry of Agriculture 
-plans in the pipeline for the government to completely disengage 
from procurement and distribution of fertilizer 
Source: Federal Budget of Nigeria, 1976/77-93 
Annex B: Ad hoc programme and policy instruments 
Period Programme Instruments Objectives Period Terminated 
April 1977 New commodity marketing 
system 
April 1980 Green Revolution 
1981 -Accelerated Development 
Area Programme (ADA) 
-Livestock Development Project 
(LDP) 
-Rural Agro-Industrial Scheme 
(RAIS) 
1986 Structural adjustment programme 
• a price fixing authority (PFA) 
»seven national commodity boards 
• allocation of substantial funds for the 
resuscitation of areas of food crop, 
livestock and fish production which 
had been hitherto handicapped 
• land clearing schemes, farm 
mechanization centres, agro-service 
centres, river basin development schemes 
• the national accelerated food production 
schemes, and tractor hire, increased supply 
of fertilizer and expansion of credit. 
• Accelerated Development Area Programme (ADA) 
• Federal, state and IBRD finance and NACB 
• World Bank Technical Assistance Programme 
abolition of commodity boards, price control 
and export taxes 
trade and exchange rate liberalization 
100% retention of export revenue 
• encouragement of production and organization 
of marketing of agricultural products 
• gradual phasing out of Nigerian Produce 
Marketing Company 
• Self-sufficiency in food by 1985 
1986 
1983 
complement ADPs 
increased output of livestock farmers 
agro-allied industrialization in rural areas 
• increased domestic food production and the 
production of cash crops 
• increased domestic supply of agricultural raw 
materials and reduction in dependence on imported 
raw materials 
• promotion of exportable cash crops (processed 
1988 
Annex B continued-
Period Programme 
1988 New Agricultural policy 
Instruments 
decentralization of prices; 
liberal trade and exchange rate policies; 
selective subsidy on farm inputs and equipment; 
tariff regulations 
favourable fiscal and credit policies 
review of land acquisition and allocation laws 
in favour of agriculture 
Objectives Period Terminated 
cash crops and consumer durables) in order to 
further diversify the export base of the economy 
self-sustained growth in the agricultural sector 
self-sufficient in food production 
structural transformation of agriculture 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts, 1977-1993. 
Annex C: Overview of the River Basin Development Authority: 1970-1993 
Year Evolution Action lag Capital 
allocation 
Actual 
expenditure 
Number of 
farmers 
resettled 
Problems 
1970 Conception 
1973 Establishment of Sokoto-Rima and Chad Basin 3 years 
1974 Operations of Sokoto-Rima and Chad Basin 1 year 
1976 Ogun-Oshun, Cross-River, Niger River, Hadejia-
Jamare, Upper Benue, Lower Benue, Benin-
Owena, Anambra-lmo, Niger Delta 
1981 No change 
1982 No change 
1983 No change 
1984 -Increase from 11 to 18 
-Decentralization 
-Change in name to River Basin and Rural 
Development Authority (RBRDA) 
1985 -Shift from direct production to land 
preparation, irrigation and provision of inputs 
1986 -Reversed re-organization of RBRDA to 
pre-1984 (reduction from 18 to 11) 
1987 -Re-organization ongoing 
629.4 
429.6 
623.2 
363.9 
371.9 
133.9 
124.0 
522.5 
287.4 
317.6 
N/A. 
N/A. 
79.3 
87.7 
2,008 
1,984 
14,178 
20,126 
7,638 
10 
-inadequate supply of 
seeds; late release of 
funds, hostility by rural 
population 
-scarcity of farm inputs, 
inability to pump sufficient 
water due to drought 
-re-organization of 
RBRDA to state-based 
16 -irregular/late release of 
Annex C continued-
Year Evolution Action lag Capital 
allocation 
Actual 
expenditure 
Number of 
farmers 
resettled 
Problems 
funds; lack of spare parts; 
inadequate rainfall 
1988 -Re-organization completed 
2 years 
183.0 
123.0 28 
1989 -No change 241.4 
210.3 N/A. 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
-Privatization and commercialization 
-Cease to handle distribution of farm 
inputs and direct agricultural production 
-Some RDAs slated for privatization 
-Non-water assets sold off 
-7 RBDAs left 
-Concentration on provision of water 
-Enactment of Decree No 101 of August 1993b 
121.1 
188.9 
127.0 
116.1 
112.8 
60.8 
104.1 
103.8 
167 
15,280 
18,596 
8,325 
a. Machinery, seeds/seedlings and fertilizer 
b. The decree vests in the Federal Government ownership of all surface and underground water resources in Nigeria through the Federal Ministry of WateR 
Resources and Rural Development. The RBDAs and other users are to obtain license before development of the resource. 
Annex D: Integrated agricultural development programmes: evolution and operations 
Year New Projects Number Farm service Dams Tractors Supply of Feeder Capital 
operational centres constructed fertilizer roads allocation 
1974 Funtua, Gusau 2 N/A 
1975 Gombe 3 N/A 
1980 Ayangba, Lafia, 
Bida, llorin 5 N/A 199 60,000 2000 
1981 -Statewide expansion 
of Funtua, Gusau and 
Gombe 
-ADAPa in Gongola 
and Borno 
5 + 2 39 10 74 77,000 3150 116.2 (29.2; 56.9; 30.1 )c 
1982 -llorin, Bida, Oyo 
North, 
Ekiti-Akoko" 
9 + 2 128 33 40 45,054 4112 604.0 (183.4; 223; 197.6) 
1983 - 10 + 2 128 22 20 68,292 1624 73.7(37.5; 19.1; 17.1) 
1984 -ADAP in Imo 10+3 19 29 17 103,925 657 52.2 (27.5; 9.6; 26.1) 
1985 10 + 3 64 19 4 197,673 1014 105.3 (21.4; 37.6; 46.3) 
1986 -Phased multi-state 19 + 3+9 
agricultural develop-
ment projects (MSADPs) 
in nine states, 15 state-
131 (137) N/A. 155 451,000 
(144000) 
1602 133.5 (25.3; 41.8; 49.4; 17.0) 
Annex D continued 
Year New Projects Number 
operational 
Farm service Dams 
centres constructed 
Tractors Supply of 
fertilizer 
Feeder 
roads 
Capital 
allocation 
wise ADPs, 4 enclave 
ADPs and 3 ADAPs 
1987 -Same as 1986 19+ 3 + 9 6(10) N/A 250 514,000 
(199000) 
914 127.3(24.9;24.98;55.8; 21.7) 
1988 -Integration of ADAPs 21 
into ADP 
-21 states and Abuja 
ADPs 
25 N/A N/A. 729,000 
(124000) 
1367 391.9 (59; 84.2; 276.3; 15.7) 
1989 21 
22 ADPs 
893 N/A. N/A 667,000 1244 410.6 (59.2; 136.6; 155.2; 59.7) 
1990 22 ADPs 22 597 N/A N/A 225,000 460.5 354.1 (43.9; 156.4; 121.6; 32.2) 
1991 22 ADPs 22 383 N/A N/A 344,700 197 448. 1 (68; 129.9; 241.9; 8.3) 
1992 22 ADPs 22 722 N/A N/A 1,410,000 1014.46 1217.5 (80.0; 296.0; 804.7; 36.8) 
1993 22 ADPs 22 583 N/A N/A 331,850 1430.5 1542 (80.5; 406; 990.9; 64.6) 
a. ADAP is Accelerated Development Area Project 
b. The llorin and Bida projects became operational only in 1981 while the feasibility reports of Oyo North and Ekiti-Akoko was completed in 1980. Thus, there is 
an action lag of at least two years. 
c. The figures in parenthesis are federal, states, World Bank contributions respectively. The fourth figure from 1986 is miscellaneous sources. 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts, (1977—1993). 
Annex E: Facts file of DFRRI, 1986-1989 
Year Allocation Roads to be Roads Actually 
Rehabilitated constructed 
Changes Problems 
1986 500 
1987 400 
1988 500 
1989 300 
60,000 N/A. 
N/A. 
N/A 
30,000km more roads to be constructed 
-indication that phase 1 consist of 30,000km 
and should be completed by July 1987 
-set up of a Presidential Task Force on 
Implementation 
progress to complete and 
upgrade to the Directorate's 
minimum specification 
8000km of the 30,000 km first 
phase 
-merger of DFRRI's recurrent expenditure with 
that of Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
-set up of a comprehensive Rural Feeder Roads 
Maintenance Programme to arrest damage to 
and prevent eventual collapse of DFRRI 
-roads did not cover culverts and bridges 
-most boreholes sunk were not functioning 
-only few villages were electrified 
-roads incapable of withstanding rainy season 
-inadequate allocation of funds 
-wasteful duplication of efforts 
-second phase of 30,000km 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts, (1977—1993). 
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